Nov 16 2011

♦ Vātsyāyana’s critique of the materialistic theory of cognition

As is well-known, according to Indian Cārvāka/Lokāyata materialism (on account of which see here) cognition (jñāna, but also caitanya) emerges only where and when the material elements (earth, water, fire and air) are mixed up to constitute a physical living body. This perspective has been, of course, criticized by lots of non-Cārvaka philosophers in lots […]

Mar 12 2010

♦ The Cārvāka Udbhaṭa Bhaṭṭa’s use of Vaiśeṣika vocabulary: the case of caitanya («self», «consciousness»)

Recently I had the opportunity to read with accuracy the fragments referring to Udbhaṭa Bhaṭṭa’s (or Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa’s) theory of consciousness, collected by Ramkrishna Bhattacharya in his Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata (Ch. 6: Cārvāka Fragments: A New Collection). According to Udbhaṭa, who is a Materialist, consciousness (caitanya, a term which, for Cārvākas, means also «self») is […]