In the 5^th chapter of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (MRP) we find the following stanza, attributed to Diṅnāga (sDe-dge 272b4-5):

slob dpon phyogs kyi glaṅ pos kyaṅ |

’di na mya ṅan ’das lam groṅ khyer du | | de bźin gśegs pa’i gsuṅ gi ñi ma’i ’od can gyis | |

bdag med śes pa’i ’phags pa stoṅ phrag ’jug | blo gros rtsiṅ ba dag gi yul ma yin | |

źes gsuṅs so | |

Into English, it could be rendered thus:

«Furthermore, by the ācārya Diṅnāga it has been said: “There, [only] the one thousand noble ones that knows selflessness by means of the radiant sun of Tathāgata’s words, enter into the citadel [at the end of] the path [leading] to nirvāṇa, [this opportunity] is not withing the domain of [those who has] coarse intellect”».

This citation comes immediately after another one from Kambala, whose contents are very similar (sDe-dge 272b4-5):

dpal kam pa las kyaṅ |

’di ni raṅ rig phra ba ste | | phra ba rnams kyi spyod yul yin | |

bdag cag lta bur gyur pa yi | | blo gros rtsiṅ bas mi śes so | |

źes gsuṅs so | |

That is:

«Moreover, by śrī Kambala it has been said: “This [reality is known by] subtle self-awareness and [therefore] is the domain/object of those who have subtle [intellect]; [it] is not known by the coarse intellect of that class [of low minded persons] like me”».

We owe to Christian Lindtner (1982: 175, note 39) the identification of this stanza with Ālokamāla 13:

svasaṃvedyā tu sā saukṣmyād buddhānām sūkṣmadarśinām |

mādṛśaiḥ svāśrayasthāpi sthūladhībhir na dṛśyate ||

As it can be observed, however, there are several discrepancies between the version quoted in the MRP and the one preserved in its original Sanskrit. These discrepancies are confirmed also by the Tibetan translation of the Ālokamāla:

raṅ rig de yaṅ phra ba’i phyis | | saṅs rgyas rnams kyis phra ba gzigs | |

raṅ la gnas kyaṅ bdag ’dra bas | | rtsiṅ ba’i phyir ni mthoṅ ba med | |

Lindtner translates:

«It [i.e., reality] can, however, due to its subtlety be personally experienced by the subtle-seeing Buddhas. Though (thusness) rests in one’s own body it canot be seen by blockheads like me».

Now, the remarkable lexical differences existing between the two versions open the door to a plenty of possible questions: did the author of the MRP misattribute to Kambala this stanza, which originally came out of the pen of another scholar? Or, do we have a version of Ālokamālā 13 that does not correspond to the one read/studied by our author? Or, did this stanza belong to a lost work of Kambala? And so forth.

Of course these doubts remain unsolvable, at least for the moment. Anyway, what is certain is the fact that the mention of the author’s name and the fact that Ālokamālā 13 is preserved – despite the different readings in MRP – allows us to figure out or, at least, to suppose which was the possible written source the compiler of the MRP had in mind.

On the contrary, after having checked his works listed in the Tibetan Canon and those preserved in Sanskrit, I have been unable to trace Diṅnāga’s stanza back to any of them. But of course I could have failed the task and may be the stanza went totally unnoticed to me for whatever reason. Moreover, I have to confess that I didn’t check the Chinese sources because to me Chinese is… Chinese! To that, I’ve also to add the fact that I’m not so well-versed in Diṅnāga’s texts, which I don’t know as well as I know Nāgārjuna’s or Bhāviveka’s ones. So it is also possible that I have not found the passage because I didn’t know where to look for it.

Thus, let us interact a bit, if you will, by making use of the same questions raised in the case of Kambala.

- Does anybody know if the one quoted above is really a stanza from Diṅnāga and, if yes, from which work it’s taken?

- Or, is it a stanza that could sound as one of Diṅnāga’s, but actually belonging to a text authored by someone else?

- Or, are we in front of a quotation whose original texts it belonged to we have to consider lost (and so, to accept or discard its diṅnāgan authorship, we can only trust, or not, the author of the MRP)?

Refernces

Lindtner, Christian. 1982. “Adversaria Buddhica”, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 26: 167-194.

Lindtner, Christian. 1985. “A Treatise on Buddhist Idealism: Kambala’s Ālokamālā”, in Christian Lindtner (ed. by), Miscellanea Buddhica, Akademisk Forlag, Copenhagen. 109-221.

In the 7th chapter of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, a work traditionally attributed to Bhāviveka, while discussing some fundamental concepts of the cittamātra doctrine, the author inserts an interesting quotation which is attributed to (the tantric?) Candrakīrtipāda (zLa-ba-grags-pa’i-źal-sṅa-na). Unfortunately, the original text from which the citation was taken remains still untraced. Nevertheless, what is interesting here, is the fact that in this excerpt it seems that at least five sub-quotations from other texts are referred to. Of these, for the moment I have been able to indentify the possible source for only the stanza beginning with the pāda: autpala rtsa ba mū la las (number [4], see below), which is indeed very similar – but not identical – to Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā 5.48 (see Eckel 2008: 414), whose Tibetan version runs as follows: autpala rtsa ba mū la las | | lo ma la sogs rgyun ’byuṅ ltar | | de bźin sems rdzas med pa las | | rgyun rnams sna tshogs ’byuṅ bar ’gyur | |; Sanskrit: yathā parṇādisantānaḥ śālūkabahuśaktitaḥ | tathādravyasataś cittāc citrāḥ saṃtativṛttayaḥ ||. Also the explanation of this stanza seems to barely coincide in both the excerpt from Candrakīrtipāda’s text and Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvālā (on account of which see Eckel 2008: 258, 414).

The following is the Tibetan text and English translation of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa passage under concern. In square brackets I have inserted the progressive numbers of the citations contained in Candrakīrtipāda’s text. The sub-citations have been underlined for the sake of better clarity.

(sDe-dge bsTan-’gyur, dBu-ma, vol. 97: TSHa, fol. 280b2-7) slob dpon zla ba grags pa’i źal sṅa nas kyaṅ | ji skad du | [1] de bas na phyi rol gyi dṅos po lta bu dmigs su med ciṅ yod pa ma yin te | sems kyi raṅ bźin yin pa’i phyir ro źes pa daṅ | yaṅ [2] chos thams cad sems las phyi rol na mi gnas te | mig yor tsam du snaṅ ba gaṅ yin pa de thams cad ni raṅ gi sems te | raṅ gi sems ñid las gźan ni ci yaṅ med do źes pa daṅ | yaṅ gsuṅs pa | [3] sems las dṅos po tha dad pa yod do źe na | chos med ces bya’o źes rgyas par gsuṅs so | | ’dir tshigs su bcad pa ni | [4] autpala rtsa ba mū la las | | lo ma la sogs rgyun ’byuṅ ltar | | de bźin sems rdzas med pa yaṅ | | chos rnams kun gyi ṅo bor gnas | | de yi don ni ’di yin te | | autpala’i tsa ba gźan daṅ ma ’brel źiṅ chu ñid la gnas śiṅ rtsa ba der gar yaṅ zug pa med kyaṅ | mtsho śin tu rgya che ba dag lo ma daṅ me tog la sogs pas khyab par nus pa bźin du sems rdzas su med pa ñid yin yaṅ kun rdzob tu phyi naṅ gi chos thams cad kyi ṅo bor gnas so | | yaṅ smras pa | [5] ji ltar lu ma’i sā lu ka | | rtsa ba med kyaṅ thams cad khyab | | rtsa ba med pa’i sems ñid kyaṅ | | nam mkha’i mthas gtugs khyab par gnas | | ’di’i don ni ’di yin te | | mtshe’u daṅ | lu ma dag ba sā lu ka źes bya ba’i sṅo źig phan tshun ’brel pas | me tog ser po źig gis lu ma’i kha chod par skye la de la rtsa ba ni zug pa med do | | de bźin du sems rtsa ba med pa bźin du nam mkhas ji tsam khyab ba de tsam du chos thams cad kyi ṅo bor gnas so | |

Translation:

Moreover, ācārya Candrakīrtipāda [wrote]: «As has been said: [1] “Therefore, the external events are similarly unperceivable and inexistent because there is [only] the nature of mind”; and again [2] “All the dharmas do not dwell outside the mind, what does merely appear [without existing in itself] is [nothing but] a mirage, [thus,] all those [dharmas] are one’s own very mind, [and what is] other than one’s own very mind is something inexistent”; and it is explained also: [3] “If one says ‘the various dharmas exist out of the mind’, [accordingly] it is declared ‘the dharmas are inexistent [in themselves]’”, thus it is explained at length. Here there is a stanza: [4] “Just as the stream of leaves and so on derives from the princial root of a lotus, similarly the nature of all the dharmas, although unreal, dwells in the mind”. The meaning of that [stanza] is this: the root of the lotus is not connected with anything else, it dwells only in the water and, although the root does not thrust everywhere into that [place where it grows], it has the power to cover with leaves and flowers the great surface of a large lake; similarly, the nature of all the external and internal dharmas, [which are] related to saṃvṛti, albeit its absence of reality, dwells in the mind. It is also said: [5] “As the śāluka [lotus sprout] of a pool, although having no root, covers all [the surface of that pool, similarly] the very mind, that has no root, dwells by covering [all] up to the limit of the space”. The meaning of this [stanza] is this: in lakelets and pools, some sprouts called śāluka, being mutually connected, bud by covering the [entire surface of the] pool with yellow flowers, and [nonetheless] the[ir] root does not thrust into that [place]; similarly, as the mind without root covers as much space [as there is], in so much [place] the nature of all the dharmas does dwell».

References

Eckel, Malcolm D. 2008. Bhāviveka and His Buddhist Opponents, Harvard University Press, Cambridge-London.

Today I have received an email from my friend Lara Maconi concerning a fund-finding campain for a documentary on E. Gene Smith (here some among the principal obituaries from newspapers: The Economist, The NY Times, The Telegraph, The Washington Post). Althought the documentary is almost completed, few but essential things are still to be done. The following is the text of the message, that with pleasure I share here with you:

Digital Dharma December 2, 2011

Dear Friends, Our documentary, Digital Dharma, is approaching the finish line.  We’ve just launched our Kickstarter campaign to raise the completion funds for the film. Digital Dharma is the story of E. Gene Smith, the man who saved Tibetan Buddhism. This feature-length documentary uncovers Gene’s 50-year journey with renowned scholars, lamas and laypeople as they struggle to find, preserve and digitize more than 20,000 volumes of ancient Tibetan text. Crossing multiple borders – geographic, political and philosophical - Digital Dharma is an epic story of a cultural rescue and how one man’s mission became the catalyst for an international movement to provide free access to the story of a people.

Status of the Film We have a compelling 86-minute fine cut in the can, but need help with the finishing (music score, audio mix, color correction and mastering) and marketing costs so that we can share Digital Dharma with the widest audience possible and help complete Gene’s mission. Kickstarter Campaign If you’re unfamiliar, here’s how it works: Kickstarter is an online fundraising platform to facilitate public support for ambitious creative projects. We have just 60 days to raise our target $30,000 and are offering great incentives in return for your support.   This is an ALL-OR-NOTHING proposition.  Every Kickstarter project must raise its target funding before its time expires. If we don’t raise our goal of $30,000 in 60 days, we lose everything, and your donation is returned to you. Your contribution is so important. It’s a way for you to help us get the film to the finish line while receiving some great gifts and experiences for your support. If you are able to make a contribution or wish to learn more about our project and Kickstarter, please click the button below: In order to participate, you’ll need to register with Amazon (if you’re not already registered).If you are unable to make a monetary donation, please donate a bit of time and become an outreach partner by telling others about this project. The power of your network can help Digital Dharma reach its goal. What Kinds of Gifts Are We Offering?  We have many different Digital Dharma-themed gifts available for those who support our project, and a donation level for every budget. Some examples: one of fifty “om” charm bracelets made by Gene’s sister Rosanne, or one of five Raku pottery pieces that she handcrafts in her home. Another reward is one of fifteen special first-edition coffee table books that include breathtaking shots from Gene’s journey, taken by the director.     **Please note that these are sample rewards, and not the exact version you will be receiving

We appreciate all your support and look forward to announcing that Digital Dharma has been successfully funded! With gratitude, Dafna Yachin and the Digital Dharma crew

The particular contents of this blog, and the fact that I add more or less only one post per month, are two relevant factors that contribute, on the one side, to select the visitors on the basis of their interests and, on the other side, to keep the number of visitors low. Indeed, and of course, a blog like the present one cannot and could not aim at having as many visitors as other more generic and/or updated blogs do have. However, I have always found very attractive to check on my google.analytics page from which countries visitors come across these pages. The reason is that I assume this information as a sort of sociological study that sheds light on, and puts in evidence, the macroareas where people interested in my research do live.

In order to share this information also with all my dear readers, today I have added a new widget, the FlagCounter (see the first right column on the bottom) by means of which one can monitorize:

- which countries (the flags),

- how many visitors from each country (the number after the flag),

- the total amount of accessed pages (first line on the bottom of the window),

- the total number of countries (second line on the bottom).

So, dear visitor, amaze me! Which country are you from?

As is well-known, according to Indian Cārvāka/Lokāyata materialism (on account of which see here) cognition (jñāna, but also caitanya) emerges only where and when the material elements (earth, water, fire and air) are mixed up to constitute a physical living body. This perspective has been, of course, criticized by lots of non-Cārvaka philosophers in lots of works. In what follows I refer and translate a passage from Vātsyāyana’s commentary on the Nyāyasūtras, where we find a sketch of the materialistic argumentation in favour of the physicity of cognition and its Naiyāyika rebuttal.

Following Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra 3.2.35-36, the first of these two aphorisms would expound a theory, attributed to a general partisan of materialism (called bhūtacaitanika, that is, an upholder of the doctrine that cognition is from material elements), according to whom activity (ārambha) and inactivity (nivṛtti) – that in Nyāyasūtra 3.2.34 are said to be occasioned by desire and aversion (which are, in their turn, defined as marks/properties of ātman) – would belong to the physical body. The second aphorism, on the contrary, represents the Naiyāyikas’ answer:

atra bhūtacaitanika āha | [Nyāyasūtra 3.2.35:] talliṅgatvād icchādveṣayoḥ pārthivādyeṣv apratiṣedhaḥ || ārambhanivṛttiliṅgāv icchādveṣāv iti yasyārambhanivṛttī tasyecchādveṣau tasya jñānam iti prāptaṃ pārthivāpy ataijasavāyavīyānāṃ śarīrāṇām ārambhanivṛttidarśanād icchādveṣajñānair yoga iti caitanyam |

[Nyāyasūtra 3.2.36:] paraśvādiṣv ārambhanivṛttidarśanāt || śarīre caitanyanivṛttiḥ | ārambhanivṛttidarśanād icchādveṣajñānair yoga iti prāptaṃ paraśvādeḥ karaṇasyārambhanivṛttidarśanāc caitanyam iti | atha śarīrasyecchādibhir yogaḥ paraśvādes tu karaṇasyārambhanivṛttī vyabhicarataḥ na tarhy ayaṃ hetuḥ pārthivāpy ataijasavāyavīyānāṃ śarīrāṇām ārambhanivṛttidarśanād icchādveṣajñānair yoga iti |

ayaṃ tarhy anyo’rthaḥ talliṅgatvād icchādveṣayoḥ pārthivādyeṣv apratiṣedhaḥ | pṛthivyādīnāṃ bhūtānām ārambhas tāvat trasasthāvaraśarīreṣu tadavayavavyūhaliṅgaḥ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ loṣṭādiṣu ca liṅgābhāvāt pravṛttiviśeṣābhāvo nivṛttiḥ | ārambhanivṛttiliṅgāv icchādveṣāv iti pārthivādyeṣv aṇuṣu taddarśanād icchādveṣayogas tadyogāj jñānayoga iti siddhaṃ bhūtacaitanyam iti |

kumbhādiṣv anupalabdher ahetuḥ | kumbhādimṛdavayavānāṃ vyūhaliṅgaḥ pravṛttiviśeṣa ārambhaḥ sikatādiṣu pravṛttiviśeṣābhāvo nivṛttiḥ | na ca mṛtsikatānām ārambhanivṛttidarśanād icchādveṣaprayatnajñānair yogaḥ | tasmāt talliṅgatvād icchādveṣayor ity ahetur iti ||

«There, the adherent to the doctrine that cognition is from material elements says: [Nyāyasūtra 3.2.35] “Because they are marks of those [activity and inactivity, which takes place only in presence of a body], there [can] not [be] negation of desire and aversion in these [bodies] made by earth etc.” Desire and aversion are the marks of activity and inactivity; [therefore,] activity and inactivity [are characteristics] of some thing, of which [also] desire and aversion [are characteristics, and] it is proper [to think] that [also] knowledge [must be a characteristic] of that [very thing]; moreover, the [body] made by earth – because activity and inactivity are observed [to be the marks] of bodies not [composed by] igneous and aereal [elements] – does possess desire, aversion and knowledge, and hence cognition.

[Nyāyasūtra 3.2.36] “[We Naiyāyikas reject all this,] because activity and absence of activity are observed in [inanimated things like] axes etc.” [This functions as a] rebuttal of [the idea that] cognition is in the body. [If] it were proper [to admit] that the combination of desire, aversion and knowledge [belongs to the body] because activity and inactividy are observed [in it, then] cognition [should be a property also] of instruments like an axe etc., because activity and inactivity are observed [also there]. But, [if only] the body possesses desire etc., then activity and inactivity of instruments such as an axe etc. deviate from [your argument], and in that case this [of yours] is not a [valid] reason [for upholding that]: moreover, the [body] made by earth – because activity and inactivity are observed [to be the marks] of bodies not [composed by] igneous and aereal [elements] – does possess desire, aversion and knowledge.

[Objection by the materialist:] in that case, this [sūtra], “Because they are marks of those [activity and inactivity], there [can] not [be] negation of desire and aversion in these [bodies] made by earth etc.” has [to be interpreted according to] another meaning. Activity is [a property] of elements like earth etc., insofar as there is a particular spontaneous attitude in moving or immovable [living] bodies, which is a mark of the component limbs of those [very bodies], and inactivity is the absence of that particular spontaneous attitude in [for instance] a lump of clay etc., because of the absence of that mark. Desire and aversion are the marks of activity and inactivity; as those [activity and inactivity] are observed in the atoms of those [elements like] the earthy one etc., there is conjunction with desire and aversion. Because there is conjunction with those [two], there is [also] conjunction with knowledge. Thus it is established that cognition [belongs] to elements.

[Answer: your argument] is not a [valid] reason because of the non perception [of activity and inactivity] in [objects like] a jar etc. [Indeed, if we follow your reasoning,] activity [should be also] a particular spontaneous attitude that is the mark of the [whole] structure of the portions of clay of a jar etc., and inactivity [should be] the absence of that particular spontaneous attitude in [things such as] gravel etc. [where there is no structure of parts]; but [in these inanimate things] there is not conjunction with desire, aversion, effort and knowledge [simply] because activity and inactivity of jars and gravel are observed. Therefore, “Of desire and aversion, because they are marks of those” is not a [valid] reason».

The materialistic perspective can be summarized as follows: (a) activity (ārambha) is a mark of only the living beings (both movable, as animals, and immovable, as vegetals); (b) activity is due to a particular spontaneous attitude (pravṛttiviśeṣa) that is peculiar to those living beings; (c) this particular spontaneous attitude can be peculiar to living beings because in primis it is a mark of the material elements that constitute their parts, and manifests itself only when and where the elements attain the form and nature of a living being. Moreover, (d) cognition is by the materialist proved to belong to the material elements on the basis of its link with desire and aversion (as the sentence tadyogāj jñānayoga, «because there is conjunction with them, there is conjunction with cognition», reveals), which are seen in their turn as the marks of activity and inactivity.

The materialist perspective is criticized by Vātsyāyana as follows. If the materialist upholds that desire and aversion exist where activity and inactivity exist, we have to consider that activity and inactivity can be observed also in non living beings, as for instance in an axe (whose activity depends on someone’s utilization of it). Vātsyāyana’s point is to reject the idea according to which activity and inactivity are primarily defined as marks of physical bodies, which are in their turn thought as an assemblage of different component parts, each of them subjected to activity and inactivity. According to Vātsyāyana, indeed, also inanimate objects have parts – like for example a jar, which has a lip, handels etc. –, but nobody would admit that these parts do actually experience desire, aversion etc.

Two main critical points against materialism follow from these considerations. (A) Cognition cannot be a simple or mere property of the elements, otherwise it should be present in each element, with the consequence that every single body would have a number of cognitions according to as many elements concure to constitute it (this is supported by Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra 3.2.37. (B) Cognition can be neither a property of the parts that constitute a body as such, otherwise it would/should exist in almost every body, because the majority of the existents are formed by different parts linked together (like in the case of a man, a jar etc.).

References

Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, T., Tarkatirtha, A. (1936-1944). Nyāyadarśanam: with Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara’s Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra’s Tātparyaṭīkā and Viśvanātha’s Vṛtti. Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing & Publ.

Colette Caillat, Selected Papers, The Pali Text Society, Bristol 2011, pp. lxxiii + 387.

From the Introduction: «Colette Caillat (1921-2007) was first trained in classical languages (Latin and Greek) and philology at the Sorbonne University, Paris, and started her career by teaching in various secondary schools. Later on, when she turned to the field of Indology, to which she had been attached through comparative linguistics and Sanskrit, she was appointed to a post at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique where she could devote herself entirely to her research. Having obtained her D.Litt. in Indian studies in 1965, she taught as a University Assistant in Lyon, before being elected at the Sorbonne as the successor to Louis Renou whose untimely death was lamented in 1966. Har academic career was then straightforward: she taught at the Sorbonne and Sorbonne-Nouvelle until her retirement in 1988, when she was elected a member of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres the same year.

Middle Inod-Aryan, Jain, and Buddhist studies are the main directions of C. Caillat’s publications».

Contents

Introduction, p. viii.

Bibliography of Colette Caillat’s works: I. Books, p. xxii; II. Editorial work, p. xxiv; III. Articles, p. xxv; IV. Contribution to A Critical Pāli Dictionary and reviews of CPD, p. xxxv; V. Personalia, p. xxxvii; VI. Reviews, p. xxxviii; VII. Index of authors or titles of the works reviewed, p. lxii; VIII. About Colette Caillat, p. lxvi.

Abbreviations, p. lxviii.

Selected Papers

1. Pour une nouvelle grammaire du pāli [Istituto di Indologia della Università di Torino, 1970], p. 1.

2. Deux études de moyen-indien [JA 248 (1960)], p. 25.

3. Nouvelles remarques sur les adjectifs moyen-indien phāsu, phāsuya [JA 249 (1961)], p. 49.

4. Les dérivés moyen-indien du type kārima [JA 253 (1965)], p. 55

5. La sémantique SHYTY dans les inscriptions indo-araméennes d’Aśoka [JA 255 (1966)], p. 75.

6. La finale -ima dans les adjectifs moyen- et néo-indiens de sens spatial [Mélanges d’indianisme à la mémoire de Loius Renou], p. 79.

7. Isipatana migadāya [JA 256 (1968)], p. 97.

8. Pali ibbha, Vedic ibhya [Buddhist Studies in Honour of I.B. Horner], p. 105.

9. À propos de sanskrit candrimā- “clair de lune” [Mélanges linguistiques offerts à Émile Benveniste], p. 115.

10. Forms of the Future in the Gāndhārī Dharmapada [Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (1977-78)], p. 125.

11. Pronoms et adjectifs de similarité en moyen indo-aryen [Indianisme et Bouddhisme], p. 131.

12. La langue primitive du bouddhisme [The Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition], p. 139.

13. États des recherches sur les inscriptions d’Aśoka [BEI 1 (1983)], p. 157.

14. Prohibited speech and subhāsita in the Buddhist Theravāda Tradition [Indologica Taurinensia XII (1984)], p. 165.

15. The Condemnation of False ~ Wrong Speech (musāvāda) in the Pāli Scriptures [Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North-Africa], p. 179.

16. Grammatical Incorrections, Stylistic Choices, Linguistic Trends (with Reference to Middle Indo-Aryan) [Sanskrit and World Culture], p. 183.

17. Sur l’authenticité linguistique des édits d’Aśoka [Dialects et formes dialectales dans les littératures indo-aryennes], p. 191.

18. The constructions mama kṛtam and mayā kṛtam in Asoka’s edicts [Proceedings of the 32. ICANAS, Hamburg 1986], p. 211.

19. Some idiosyncrasies of language and style in Asoka’s Rock Edicts at Girnar [Hinduismus und Buddhismus], p. 213.

20. Notes grammaticales sur les documents kharoṣṭhī de Niya [Documents et archives provenant de l’Asie Centrale, Actes du Colloque franco-japonais, Kyoto 4-8 octobre 1988], p. 227.

21. Asoka et les gens de la brousse (XIII M-N) “qu’ils se repentent et cessent de tuer” [BEI 9 (1991)], p. 243.

22. The “double optative suffix” in Prakrit Asoka XIII (N) na haṃnesu / na haṃñeyasu [Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (1993)], p. 249.

23. Connections between Asokan (Shahbazgarhi) and Niya Prakrit? [IIJ 35 (1992)], p. 259.

24. Deux notes de moyen indo-aryen. I. Les quatre thèmes de présent de HAN- en pāli. II. ‘Double optatif’ en māhārāṣṭhrī jaina ? [BEI 10 (1992)], p. 271.

25. Doublets désinentiels en moyen indo-aryen [Bopp-Symposium 1992 der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin], p. 287.

26. Gleanings from a Comparative Reading of Early Canonical Buddhist and Jaina Text [Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 26,1 (2003)], p. 301.

27. Manuscrits bouddhisques du Gandhāra [CRAI, janvier-mars 2003], p. 327.

Review articles of A Critical Dictionary of Pāli

28. CPD II.1-3 [Indogermanische Forschungen 71.3 (1966), pp. 306-309], p. 335.

29. CPD II.4 [Indogermanische Forschungen 74 (1969), pp. 223-25], p. 339.

30. CPD II.5 [Indogermanische Forschungen 75 (1970), pp. 299-303], p. 343.

31. CPD II.7 [Indogermanische Forschungen 78 (1973), pp. 247-49], p. 349.

32. CPD II.6, CPD II,8 [Indogermanische Forschungen 79 (1974), pp. 250-55], p. 353.

33. CPD II.9 [Indogermanische Forschungen 81 (1976), pp. 327-29], p. 359.

34. CPD II.10, CPD II.11 [Indogermanische Forschungen 88 (1983), pp. 312-18], p. 363.

Word Index, p. 371.

Subject Index, p. 378.

Main authors and texts cited, p. 384.

Corrigenda, p. 387.

The Centre for Eurasiatic and Afroasiatic Studies (CEAS), Bucharest organizes:

The Fifth International Vedic Workshop

Hotel Novotel, sala Paris Rive Droite, Bucharest

20.09.2011 – 11 papers

9.00-11.00 official opening:
Sarvaśākhāsamanvayam vaidikamaṅgalam   
addresses by the organizers: Michael Witzel, Shrikant S. Bahulkar, Jan E. M. Houben

11.00-11.30 coffee break

11.30-13.00 – plenary session: 3 papers
MODERATOR: Asko Parpola
◦ Jan E. M. Houben: From Fuzzy-Edged “Family-Veda” to the Canonical Śākhas of the Catur-Veda: Structures and Tangible Traces
◦ Dipak Bhattacharya: Trayī, triads and the Vedas
◦ Madhav Deshpande: Vedicizing a Post-Vedic Text: The case of Ganeṣa Atharvaśīrṣa Upaniṣad

13.00-15.00 lunch

15.00-17.00 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Yasuke Ikari
◦ Michael Witzel: The Veda Śākhās of Kashmir
◦ Johannes Bronkhorst: Vedic schools in northwestern India
◦ Saraju Rath: Donees and their śākhās in Epigraphical sources: North and Central India
◦ Shrikant S. Bahulkar: Attempts towards Preservation and Revival of the Śaunakīya Atharvaveda

17.00-17.30 break

17.30- 18.30 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Werner Knobl
◦ Hartmut Scharfe: Two on a Swing:  A new Perspective on the Ṛgveda
◦ Cezary Galewicz: The Power of the Printed Veda: on early Indian printed editions of the Ṛgveda
◦ Thennilapuram Mahadevan: Was there a Bāṣkala Ṛgveda?
◦ Braj Bihari Chaubey: Āśvalāyana Saṁhitā: its salient features.

21.09.2011 – 16 papers

 8.30-10.30 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Hartmut Scharfe
◦ Silvia d’Intino:  Les Ecoles védiques et la pratique de l’exégèse. Le cas de Skandasvāmin/The Vedic śākhās and the exegetic work: the case Skandasvāmin
◦ Jared S. Klein: Intrastanzaic Repetition in the Rigveda (Verba and Res): a Final Integration
◦ Eijiro Doyama: Kṣetrasya Pati and Mandhātar
◦ Joel Brereton: Atirātra

10.30-11.00 break

11.00-13.00 – plenary session : 4 papers
MODERATOR: Madhav Deshpande
◦ Yasuke Ikari: The place of the Vādhūla school in the Yajurvedic traditions.
◦ Toshifumi Gotō: A survey of new evidence as to formation of the Yajurveda and Brāhmaṇa texts
◦ Kyoko Amano: The indication of divergent ritual opinions in the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā
◦ Michel Angot: Les deux systèmes d’accentuation dans les parties finales de la branche Taittirīya du Veda (Āraṇyaka et Upaniṣad)

13.00-15.00 lunch

15.00-17.00 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Konrad Klaus 
◦ Asko Parpola: The ritual authorities and Vedic schools and texts quoted or referred to in the Jaiminīya-Śrautasūtra
◦ Masato Fujii: The Sāmavedic Śākhā Backgrounds of the Jaiminīya-Upaniṣad-Brāhmaṇa and the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad: A Comparison
◦ Finnian Moore Gerety: Survivals & Revivals: Notes on the Transmission of Jaiminīya Sāmaveda in Contemporary South India
◦ Anne-Marie Quillet:  La discussion sur le prāyaścitta décryptée : Sāmavidhāna-brāhmaṇa, Prap. I khaṇḍa 5-8/Decrypting the prāyaścitta discussion: Sāmavidhāna-brāhmaṇa, Prap. I khaṇḍa 5-8

17.00-17.30 break

17.30- 18.30 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Dipak Bhattacharya
◦ Elizabeth Tucker: Some Linguistic Features of the Paippalāda Saṃhitā in Relation to the Language of the Ṛgveda
◦ Shilpa Sumant: Karmasamuccaya: A Paippalādin Ritual Manual
◦ Velizar Sadovski: Structure and contents of mantra lists and catalogues in the two major śākhas of the Atharvaveda and in other Vedic traditions.
◦ Julieta Rotaru: Paiṭhīnasi, the dharmakāra of the Atharvavedins and his śākhā

22.09.2011 – 8 papers

8.30-10.30 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Masato Fujii 
◦ Konrad Klaus: The relation between Vedic Śākhās in the light of the Śrautasūtras
◦ Makoto Fushimi: Formation of a Śrautasūtra, — the influence of preceding texts on the BaudhSS
◦ Timothy Lubin: The Baudhāyanīya Contribution to Smārta Hinduism
◦ Naoko Nishimura: The Development of the New- and Full-Moon Sacrifice and the Yajurveda Schools: mantras, their brāhmaṇas, and the offerings

10.30-11.00 break

11.00-13.00 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Patrick Olivelle 
◦ Ambarish Khare: Domestic Rituals in the Taittirīya Tradition: A Study of four Gṛhyasūtras
◦ Anne Keßler-Persaud: Competing composition – The ‘grammar’ of Baudhāyana’s, Āpastamba’s and Hiraṇyakeśin’s marriage ritual
◦ Shingo Einoo: Development of the tradition of the funeral rite in the Āśvalāyana school:  Āśvalāyana Śrautasūtra, gṛhyasūtra and two pariśiṣṭas to the gṛhyasūtra
◦ François Voegeli: Vedic Hunting

13.00-15.00 lunch

Transfer to Sinaia

23.09.2011 – 16 papers

8.30-10.30 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: B.B. Chaubey
◦ S. A. S. Sarma: The Priests of the Avudayar Temple in Tamil Nadu: Promoters of the Agniveśyagṛhyasūtra
◦ G.U. Thite: Āpastamba and other Schools of Vedic Ritual
◦ Junko Sakamoto-Goto: The ultimate Agnihotra (ŚB-M XI 3,1, ŚB-K III 1,4, JB I 19f., VādhAnv II 13)
◦ Nirmala Kulkarni: Scribes of Śukla Yajurvedic Manuscripts

10.30-11.00 break

11.00-13.00 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Joel Brereton
◦ Georges-Jean Pinault: About the name of Bṛhaspati
◦ Eystein Dahl: Morphosyntax and modality in Vedic: The development of the Subjunctive
◦ Junuchi Ozono: The periphrastic perfect in the Vedic language and Pāṇini’s Grammar
◦ Máté Ittzés: Light verb construction vs. simple verb in Vedic

13.00-15.00 lunch

15.00-17.00 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Georges-Jean Pinault
◦ Werner Knobl: The Profane in Vedic Prose. Ways of referring to the extra-ritual and non-mythological reality from inside sacred texts
◦ Alexis Pinchard: Roots and Branches: Veda as an Inverted Tree
◦ Kiyotaka Yoshimizu: Tolerance and Intolerance in Kumārila’s Views on the Vedic śākhā
◦ Maitreyee Deshpande: The Transition in the Concept of Time in Vedic Ritual as Seen in the Several Vedic Schools

17.00-17.30 break

17.30- 18.30 – plenary session : 4 papers
MODERATOR: Toshifumi  Gotō
◦ Madhavi Kolhatkar: Peculiarities of some Vedic Śākhās
◦ Joanna Jurewicz: Aspects of continuity of the Vedic tradition
◦ Borayin Larios: The Veda transmission in contemporary Mahārāṣṭra:
preservation and innovation.
◦ Pt. Chaitanya Narayan: Kale Rare Ved Branches – Present Situation in India

TOTAL: 52 papers

The following is the agenda, kindly sent via mail by Elisa Freschi, of:

The Study of South Asia: between Antiquity and Modernity: Parallels and Comparisons.

The Coffee Break Conference — 2

(8-10 September 2011)

Where: Institute of Oriental Studies, Caserma Sani, via Principe Amedeo 182b (Underground “Vittorio”), Rome

1

1.1  Language as a Way of Salvation

Thursday the 8th, 8.30-13 sine tempore, chair: Marco Ferrante

• 8.30-8.35, Camillo Formigatti and Elena Mucciarelli, General Introduction.

• 8.35-8.40, Marco Ferrante, Introduction to the Panel.

• 8.40-9.20, Paolo Visigalli (University of Cambridge), How can I get a cow just by saying “cow”?  an exploration into the power of language in ancient India.

• 9.20-10, Enrico Giulia, The Japanese Polyglots of Salvation: Miwa-ryū and its multilinguistic approach.

• 10-10.40, Marco Ferrante, Language, Salvation and their Relation: the soteriological goal according to the ancient Indian grammarians.

10.40-11, coffee break

• 11-11.40, Marco Lauri, Three ways to happiness. Arabic language and its paths to salvation.

• 11.40-12.20, Priya Darshini Swamy (University of Leiden), One Language is Not Enough: The Use of Sanskrit Among Hindus in Amsterdam.

• 12.20-13, Roberta Amato (Archivio di Stato di Venezia), Language as a sign of the times in Timor-Leste. The perception of the Portuguese language as salvation between politics and religious belief.

13-14.15, Lunch

1.2  The Development Question in South Asia: Policies and Processes

Thursday the 8th, 14.15-17.20, chair: Matilde Adduci

• 14.15-14.20, Paola Cagna, Introduction to the Panel.

• 14.20-15, Daniela Bevilacqua, Divine Enterprise, the intime relationship between new Hindu religious organisations, Hindu nationalism and power élites.

• 15-15.40, Paola Cagna, The Self-Help groups movement between poverty alleviation and women’s empowerment: a case study from South India.

15.40-16, coffee break

• 16-16.40, Valentina Prosperi, Casual migrant workers in the construction industry in India. Gender dimension.

• 16.40-17.20, Simona Lanzoni, Women, empowerment and microcredit.

17.20-17.30, coffee break

1.3  Round-table on History and Historiography

Universalist theories in past, present and research. Or: How autopoietic was primitive communism?

Thursday the 8th, 17.30-19.30, chair: Mark Schneider (university of Hamburg)

2

2.1  “Indigenous” grammars

Friday the 9th 8.30-13, chair: Giovanni Ciotti (university of Cambridge)

• 8.30-8.35, Giovanni Ciotti Introduction to the Panel.

• 8.35-9.25, Philomen Probert (University of Oxford), Underlying forms and derivations in ancient Greek theory of prosody.

• 9.20-10.15, Maria Piera Candotti (University of Lausanne) and Tiziana Pontillo (University of Cagliari), Linguistic layers and their role in structuring Pāṇini’s grammar.

10.15-10.30, coffee break

• 10.30-11.20, Christian Pallone, Japanese grammatical traditions.

• 11.20-12.10, Stefano Seminara (Pontificio Istituto Biblico â” Rome), Sumerian grammatical traditions.

• 12.10-13, Carlo Vessella, Greek grammatical traditions.

13-14.15, Lunch

• 14.15-15, Artemij Keidan, The Syntax of the simple sentence.

2.2  Round table on Borrowing representational devices across language speculation

What happens when representational devices developed by a tradition to describe a language A are employed to describe a language B?

Friday the 9th 15-17, chair: Giovanni Ciotti

• 15-15.30, Introductory speech, Luca Alfieri, A Contribution to the History of the Concept of Root.

• 15.30-17, Open Discussion

17-17.15, coffee break

2.3  Narratives in South Asian philosophical texts

Friday the 9th 17.15-19.30, chair: Daniele Cuneo

• 17.15-17.20, Daniele Cuneo, Introduction to the Panel.

• 17.20-18.10, Robert Leach (University of Edinburgh), Textual Deference: Philosophy in the Spandapradīpikā.

• 18.10-19, Kate Wharton (Research Assistant to the Revd Canon Guy Wilkinson), The Teacher as Mother of Midwife?  A Comparison of Brahmanical and Socratic Methods of Education.

• 19-19.30, Open Discussion

3

3.1  The relevance of texts for the study of art

Saturday the 10th 8.30-11.20, chair: Elisa Ganser

• 8.30-8.35, Elisa Ganser, Introduction to the Panel.

• 8.35-9.25, Ciro Lo Muzio, Written sources versus material record: some views on a thorny issue.

• 9.25-10.15, Felix Otter (University of Heidelberg), Vastuvidyā between text and practice: Some considerations.

10.15-10.30, coffee break

• 10.30-11.20, Anna Tosato (University of Mysore), The Use of Traditional Texts in the Interpretation of Dance Sculptures (Nāṭyaśāstra-s, Śilpaśāstra-s and Vāstusūtra Upaniṣad).

11.20-11.35, coffee break

3.2  Round Table on Present Results and Further Goals

Saturday the 10th, 11.35-12.35, chair: Elena Mucciarelli and Cristina Bignami

_____________________________

For further info, abstracts and additional bibliography: http://asiatica.wikispaces.com

Download here the pdf.

In “Adversaria Buddhica”, an article published by Christian Lindtner on the Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 26 (1982), the author collects the references that Bhāviveka makes in his Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (MRP) to other contemporary or previous philosophers or works. In the list on pages 175-176, we meet with the following point «d) A verse from “Guruguru’s *Paramārthanyāyagīti (?)” (…bla ma’i bla mas kyaṅ Don dam par rigs pa’i glu…) […]. It may actually be traced to Saraha’s Dohākośa».

The verse quoted in the MRP runs thus (sDe-dge, dBu-ma, TSHa, 281a1-2):

raṅ gi sems ñid kun gyi sa bon te ||

gaṅ la srid daṅ mya ṅan ’das ’phro ba ||

’dod pa’i ’bras bu ster bar byed pa yi ||

yid bźin ’dra ba’i sems la phyag ’tshal lo ||

Clearly, as is well-known, this is – with little variants – nothing but the Dohākośa’s stanza:

sems ñid gcig pu kun gyi sa bon te ||

gaṅ la srid daṅ mya ṅan ’das ’phro ba ||

’dod pa’i ’bras bu ster bar byed pa yi ||

yid bźin nor ’dra’i sems la phyag ’tshal lo ||

Lindtner, in the abovementioned article (p. 175, n. 40), quotes also the Apabhraṃśa version of this excerpt (the translation of the verse is here irrelevant). The presence of a passage from the Dohākośa is very helpful for dating the MRP, because Saraha (with all probability 7th-8th century), as we have seen, is there said to have been the guruguru (the master’s master) of Bhāviveka (on this subject see David Seyfort Ruegg’s arguments in his “On the authorship of some works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya”, pp. 62-63). Hence, if we take for granted the fact that Saraha is the author of the stanza quoted in the MRP – and I do not see, for the moment, any valid reason for refuting that –, it follows that the problem does not point at all on Saraha, rather on the name of Saraha’s work as referred to by Bhāviveka: Don dam par rigs pa’i glu (*Paramārthanyāyagīti, according to Lindtner’s reconstruction), which is undoubtedly a title quite different from Dohākośagīti (Tib. Do ha mdzod kyi glu).

So, the question is: should we perhaps suppose that the *Paramārthanyāyagīti is a lost work of Saraha? I personally think that this supposition is unnecessary. Indeed, if we translate don dam par rigs pa’i glu, we would have something like «The song of the argument(s) for/concerning the supreme meaning». Interestingly, this definition reminds us the colophon of the Dohākośagīti, which runs thus (sDe-dge, rGyud, Wi, 77a3):

rnal ’byor gyi dbaṅ phyug chen po dpal sa ra ha chen po’i źal sṅa nas mdzad pa do ha mdzod ces bya ba de kho na ñid rnal du mtshon pa don dam pa’i yi ge rdzogs so ||

That is:

Here finishes the letter (*lekha) concerning the supreme meaning [which] actually exhibits reality, called Dohākośa and composed by the great master of yoga Saraha.

On the basis of all this, I suggest that Bhāviveka attempted a general description of the work of Saraha – probably inspired by the colophon quoted above – instead of mentioning its title. A possible/plausible explanation of don dam par rigs pa’i glu could therefore be: a) glu stands for do ha mdzod [kyi glu] in the colophon; b) rigs pa conceptually stands for (de kho na ñid) rnal du mtshon pa in the colophon; and c) obviously don dam pa refers to the same word in the colophon.

The main points that in my opinion deserve further investigation are: a) Lokāyatas are said to adhere to a non-substantial ahetuvāda; b) the doctrines of production by svabhāva, by Īśvara, etc., belong to the domain of the substantial ahetuvāda; thus, c) we would expect that *Lokākṣa’s Lokāyatas were described as asvabhāvavādins; but d) in passage 2) they are described as svabhāvavadins, and in passage 3) as both partisans of svabhāvavāda and of a “selective” doctrine of production by causal efficacy.

The Sanskrit equivalents of Tibetan main philosophical terms have been referred to.

1) Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā sDe-dge, dBu-ma, Wa 111a7-b2

[the concept of] “without cause” (ahetuta) is [interpreted in a] twofold [way]: non-substantial and substantial (adravyabhūta ca dravyabhūta). There, non-substantial [refers to the] doctrine (vāda) of the absolute non existence (atyantābhāva) of a substantial cause (hetuvastubhūta); this is the doctrine of the origination without cause of the entities (bhāva) [derived] from the argumentation (siddhānta) of the Lokāyatas. Substantial [refers to the] doctrine according to which there is another entity, dissimilar (asadṛśa) to the substantial cause; this is the doctrine of the different cause [derived] from the argumentations of the causal doctrines [referring to] svabhāva, Īśvara, etc.

2) Wa 115a5-b2

“svabhāvavāda” is the doctrine of the origination of entities from own nature [upheld by] the mahārṣi called Lokākṣa, the author of [several] argumentations of the Lokāyata. The word “svabhāvavādin” refers to the followers of the argumentations of mahārṣi Lokākṣa and stands for (vākyādhyāhāra) Lokāyatikas.

3) Wa 120b6-121a3

From the treatises (śāstra) of those who have strength in [upholding] efficacy (pravṛttibalavat), [that is] the non-Buddhist (tīrthika) Lokāyatikas [we know that]: «some entities as a foetus (arbuda), a sprout (aṅkura), etc., arise by means of svabhāva without [the need for the intervention of other] conditions (apratyaya); some [other] entities as a jar (ghaṭa), a blanket (paṭa), etc., are caused to come forth in connection to [external] conditions», they say, «because not every entity is born by means of svabhāva, the Madhyamika establishes that all entities do not arise from svabhāva, [but this] is proving what is already proved» [this is] their explanation (uddeśa). There, “those who have strength in [upholding] efficacy” [refers to] the disciples of mahārṣi Lokākṣa, “to have strength in [upholding] efficacy” is said [with reference to] “origination”; hence, another opinion of the Lokāyatikas is here summarized (upasaṃ√hṛ). It is said “those who have strength in [upholding] efficacy” [with reference to] those who have adhered to the [doctrines of the] Lokāyatikas, and because there are classes and branches [among those who have] strength in [upholding] efficacy, it is said “those who have strength in [upholding] efficacy” [making use of the plural], so it is said “they say”. Thus it is explained.

4) Wa 163a1-2

“ahetuvāda” is said [to be] the axiom (siddhānta) of the Lokāyata.