One of the works that happens to me to deal with from time to time is the Skhalita-pramathana-yuktā-hetu-siddhi, attributed to Āryadeva. Today I’d like to put forward few considerations on the svabhāvavāda section (pūrvapakṣa only) contained in this writing. In what follows I provide the critical edition, the translation and an explanation of the section:

phyi naṅ skye mched chos rnams thams cad ni | |

ṅo bo ñid las grub pa gźan las min | |

sran zlum skyer tsher gzaṅs riṅs rno ba daṅ | |

rma bya’i mjug ma mgrin pa’i tshogs bkra daṅ | |

ñi śar chu rnams thur du ’bab pa rnams | |

ṅo bo ñid las grub ste rgyu yod min | |

The external and internal āyatanas, and all the dharmas are established by the own nature (svabhāva), they are not [determined] by [something] other. The pea is spherical, the summit of a thorny hedge of barberry bushes is sharp, the multitude [of feathers] of the neck and tail of a peacock is multicolored, the sun rises, the water flows downwards. Since [all the events] are established by means of the own nature, [it follows that] there is not a cause (hetu).

What is noteworthy here, is the fact that the svabhāvavāda appears to be assimilated to a sort of ahetuvāda. Indeed, besides the reference to some among the classical examples adducted by the svabhāvavādins in order to validate and corroborate their own theory, the last pāda of this pūrvapakṣa section explicitly states that if we admit a svabhāva, then we cannot admit any hetu. This position sounds quite inconsistent because to reject any hetu means to deny also any svabhāva, which would play the role of cause. In fact, as is well known, the classical svabhāvavāda takes the svabhāva to be the cause of everything. Therefore, it remains unclear to which kind of svabhāvavāda is Āryadeva pointing at.

The problem is, therefore: how to explain this apparent discrepancy if we don’t want to admit that Āryadeva made here a bloomer? Fortunately, Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha comes in our help. The śloka 110, indeed, runs as follows: sarvahetunirāśaṃsaṃ bhāvānāṃ janma varṇyate | svabhāvavādibhis te hi nāhuḥ svam api kāraṇam || (“The svabhāvavādins describe the origin of the events as indifferent to all causes; for they do not consider even the [svabhāva] itself as [their] cause”). Kamalaśīla, while commenting on this passage, seems to testify the fact that from a certain epoch onwards, there existed at least two different versions of the svabhāvavāda – as it were – a deterministic and an accidentalistic one: pūrvakās tu svabhāvaṃ kāraṇam icchanti ete tam api necchantīti bhedaḥ || (“Then, the former ones maintain that svabhāva is the cause [of everything], these [others, on the contrary] maintain that [the cause of everything] is not even that [svabhāva]; this is the difference [between them]”). [I owe these reference to the kindness of Ramkrishna Bhattacharya].

We conclude that by the former group, svabhāva was supposed to be a sort of universal power that determines, from outside, the development of the events (hence, things cannot not be the way they are because of this outer force), whereas for the latter group, svabhāva seems to indicate nothing but the nature of the single things (hence, things cannot not be the way they are because their inner peculiar nature spontaneously makes them be that way). The “spontaneistic” perspective coincides with the abovementioned ahetuvāda because the coming into being by itself of a thing means nothing but to be without a cause. This interpretation sheds light on some apparently contradictory passages on the Lokāyata philosophy that I’ve found in Avalokitavrata’s Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā and that I’ve discussed in short here.

Andrea Acri, Dharma Pātañjala; A Śaiva Scripture from Ancient Java Studied in the Light of Related Old Javanese and Sanskrit Texts, Egbert Forsten 2012, pp. xviii + 706. Gonda Indological Series XVI

The book presents an edition, English translation and study of the Dharma Pātañjala, a previously unpublished Old Javanese-Sanskrit Śaiva scripture transmitted through a single palm-leaf codex of West Javanese origin dating back to the 15th century AD.
The cultural and doctrinal background of the text, as well as its codicological and philological aspects, are introduced in Part I. Part II presents an annotated diplomatic edition of the text with facsimile reproductions of the codex on facing pages, followed by a critical edition with English annotated translation. Part III is a systematic study focusing on the interpretation of the doctrines taught in the Dharma Pātañjala in comparison with related Sanskrit texts from the Indian Subcontinent and Old Javanese scriptures from the Indonesian Archipelago.
The Dharma Pātañjala is doubly important: first, because it has been preserved on a codex belonging to a rare tradition of manuscripts from Java, which is significantly older than the majority of Balinese manuscripts containing Old Javanese texts; and second, because it documents an early tradition of speculative texts (Tattva), which was previously known to us only through two Old Javanese scriptures, namely the Vṛhaspatitattva and the Tattvajñāna. The Dharma Pātañjala thus fills a gap in our knowledge of Śaiva theology and philosophy in pre-Islamic Indonesia, and also casts light on the origin and development of Śaivism in the Indian Subcontinent.
The author of the Dharma Pātañjala adopted a variety of Pātañjala (aṣṭāṅga) yoga instead of the Śaiva (ṣaḍaṅga) yoga that is common in other Old Javanese texts, and attuned it to a Śaiva doctrinal framework. When elaborating his syncretic system, the author seemingly followed a hitherto unknown commentarial tradition to the Sanskrit Yogasūtra that is related, albeit by no means identical, to that of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya. The Dharma Pātañjala also documents a variety of non-dualist Śaivism that may be regarded as early Saiddhāntika in nature, but in which more archaic, pre-Saiddhāntika (i.e. Pāśupata) elements have been retained as doctrinal ‘fossils’.

CONTENTS

Preface — XI
Notes on Conventions — XIV

I INTRODUCTION

The Text and its Place in the Tutur/Tattva Genre — 3
The West Javanese Tutur Tradition — 3
Tuturs vis-à-vis Tattvas — 8
Relative Chronology of Tuturs and Tattvas — 10
Tuturs and Tattvas vis-à-vis Sanskrit Siddhāntatantras — 11
Title of the Text — 16
Structure — 17
Dialogic Framework — 20
Śāstric Style — 23
Résumé — 29
Manuscript — 43
History — 44
Script — 47
Colophon — 50
Language — 53
Spelling — 53
Non-standard Old Javanese forms — 61
Non-standard Sanskrit tadbhavas — 62
Scribal Errors — 65
Omission — 65
Addition — 69
Substitution — 72
Transposition — 79
Other Sources of Corruption — 79
Editorial Policies — 81
Why Two Editions? — 81
Diplomatic Edition — 83
Critical Edition — 88
Treatment of Sanskrit — 95
Notes on the Translation — 97

II TEXT & TRANSLATION

Facsimile Reproductions & Parallel Diplomatic Edition — 101
Critical Edition & Parallel Translation — 193

III DOCTRINE

The Lord — 343
As the Absolute — 343
As Personal God — 355
As an Incarnated Being — 365
As the Same as or Different from His Creation — 378
As the Material or Instrumental Cause of the Universe — 388

The Soul — 391
Vis-à-vis the Lord — 392
Losing its Divine Status — 398
At Liberation — 410
Obtaining the Lord’s Powers during Life — 418

Cosmos — 421
Lord, Soul, Māyā — 422
The Thirty Principles of the Universe — 424
Cosmography and Geography — 429

Man — 435
Citta and Buddhi — 435
Bhāvas and Pratyayas — 439
Ahaṅkāra, Manas and the Lower Constituents — 448
Physiology — 456
Subtle Body — 459

Karma — 463

Yoga — 477
Samādhi and the stages of Yoga — 481
The Eight Ancillaries — 510
The Yogic Powers — 528
Prayogasandhi — 544

Right Knowledge — 551
As Salvific Knowledge — 551
As the Three Valid Means of Knowledge — 552

Wrong Knowledge — 557
The Materialist Doctrine — 559
Admitting only Direct Perception — 564
Denying the Lord and Summum Bonum — 570
Upholding Non-Existence as Origin and End of the Universe — 584
Denying Causation — 592
Denying Karma — 595
Denying Heaven and Hell — 598
Denying Soul and Liberation — 602
Upholding Hedonism — 611

APPENDICES — 617
A: Parallel Synopses of Three Tattvas — 619
B: Parallel Synopses of the Yogapāda of the DhPāt and the YS[Bh] — 633
C: Transliteration Tables — 637

SIGLA — 639
BIBLIOGRAPHY — 643
GENERAL INDEX — 671
INDEX OF TEXT PASSAGES — 689

To solve the problem of who the author of the Skhalitapramathanayuktāhetusiddhi (SPHYS) was, is a very difficult task. In order to fix a starting point, however, let us begin by admitting that his name was really Āryadeva, as is referred in all the colophons.¹ Moreover, I take for granted that he was a later namesake of the famous third century CE Āryadeva, who was in his turn a disciple of Nāgārjuna and compiler of the Catuḥśataka. In support to this perspective we have, for instance, the fact that in the excerpt dedicated to the Cārvāka philosophy, the author mixed up different Lokāyata and Cārvāka doctrines as if he were convinced that they belonged to one single school. This was possible only by the fourth century onwards, because “no much earlier than the fourth century CE, lokāyata came to mean materialism”.² Before the fourth century, indeed, the term lokāyata did broadly refer to certain dialectical methods used by some groups of brāhmaṇas, but not at all to materialism stricto sensu. And this determines that our Āryadeva cannot be identified with his homonymous standard-bearer of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy.

However, it seems that he cannot be identified either with the other Āryadeva, the tantric teacher who belonged to the Ārya school of the Guhyasamāja tradition and wrote important tantric works, such as the Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa and the Caryāmelāpakapradīpa. It is opinion of Christian Wedemeyer, indeed, that the terminus post quem of the Caryāmelāpakapradīpa must be placed “into at least the mid-to-late ninth century”.³ If we take seriously into account this dating, the problem arises insofar as, according to its colophons, the SPHYS has been translated into Tibetan by the two scholars Sarvajñādeva and dPal-brtsegs, who lived straddling the eighth and ninth centuries CE, that is, fifty or more years before the compilation of the Caryāmelāpakapradīpa.

As is well known, Tāranātha refers that Sarvajñādeva flourished during king Mahīpāla’s reign and was a contemporary of Jinamitra. Mahīpāla ruled over 52 years and died more or less in the same period in which also the Tibetan king Ral-pa-can passed away.⁴ According to the chronicles, Ral-pa-can held the scepter from 814/817 and 836 CE.⁵ Consequently, we infer that Mahīpāla’s reign should have begun by the eighties of the eighth century. This must be the period in which also Sarvajñādeva started his monastic career. As regards dPal-brtsegs, on the other hand, we know that he translated into Tibetan a considerable amount of Sanskrit texts together with several other scholars, among whom we can mention here Vimalamitra,⁶ Vidyākarasiṃha⁷ and Jinamitra.⁸ Now, it seems that at least two Vimalamitra(s) lived almost in the same period, the one little after the other. The first Vimalamitra would have been a contemporary of Kamalaśīla, and would hence have flourished during the reign or a period of the reign of the king KHri-sroṅ-lde-btsan (755-797 CE; according to ’Gos lo-tsā-ba: 755-780),⁹ whereas the second Vimalamitra is said to have been a contemporary of Sarvajñādeva and, thus, to have flourished during the reigns of Mahīpāla and Ral-pa-can.¹⁰ According to the chronicles, moreover, dPal-brtsegs succeeded Pūrṇavardhana and Jinamitra in the line of transmission of Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya.¹¹ It is well known also that Pūrṇavardhana was a contemporary of Buddhaguhya, of king Dharmapāla and of KHri-sroṅ-lde-btsan.¹² Furthermore, Vimalamitra (with all probability, the second one) is listed among the direct disciples of Buddhaguhya.

These observations suggest to us the following conclusions. (a) dPal-brtsegs lived straddling the eighth and ninth centuries CE, probably in a period little after the passing away of Kamalaśīla (whose assassination took place during KHri-sroṅ-lde-btsan’s reign). (b) Because dPal-brtsegs succeeded Jinamitra, it is likely to think that he was younger than both Vimalamitra and Sarvajñādeva. On the basis of the information collected so far, hence, we infer that the SPHYS must surely have been written at least some decades before Ral-pa-can’s epoch. However, we have also to reflect upon the fact that a text, during this time, was probably considered eligible to be translated into Tibetan only if it enjoyed good esteem within this or that Buddhist circle… and of course the – so to speak – process of eligibility requires time. Nonetheless, this consideration allows us to conclude, with a good degree of plausibility, that the author of the SPHYS flourished between the fourth-fifth and the eighth centuries CE. Even if this is a wide span of time that represents only a first and imperfect appraisal of the matter, our conclusion is nonetheless sufficient in order to determine that the author of the SPHYS should not be identified with none of the other two Āryadeva(s), the Madhyamaka and the tantric one.

Notes

(1) This is not at all an outlandish observation. Indeed, to Āryadeva are attributed texts that actually have not been written by this author as, for instance, the Madhyamakabhramaghāta, which is nothing but an excerpt of Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvālā (see Lindtner 1982: 173, note 21).

(2) Bhattacharya (2009: 195).

(3) Wedemeyer (2007: 13).

(4) Chattopadhyaya D. (1997: 284-285).

(5) On Ral-pa-can see Chattopadhyaya A. (1996: 250-265).

(6) Roerich (1995: 102).

(7) Roerich (1995: 331).

(8) Bu-ston (Obermiller 1999: 191) refers to us that, together with kLu’i-dbaṅ-po (*Nāgendra) and others, dPal-brtsegs compiled a catalogue of the Sanskrit texts translated into Tibetan, accompanied by adhyāya and śloka indexes.

(9) Chattopadhyaya A. (1995: 212-220). See also Tucci (1971).

(10) Chattopadhyaya D. (1997: 422-423), who refers from Roerich (1995: 191-192).

(11) Roerich (1995: 344).

(12) Chattopadhyaya D. (1997: 276). 

References

Lindtner, Christian. 1982. “Adversaria Buddhica”, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 26: 167-194.

Wedemeyer, Christian K. 2007. Āryadeva’s Lamp that Integrates the Practices (Caryāmelāpakapradīpa): The Gradual Path of Vajrayāna Buddhism According to the Esoteric Community Noble Tradition, Columbia University Press, New York.

Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. 2009. Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, Società Editrice Fiorentina, Firenze.

Roerich, George N. 1995. The Blue Annals (Parts i & ii Bound in One), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi rep.

Chattopadhyaya, Alaka. 1996. Atīśa in Tibet, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi rep.

Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad et al. 1997. Tāranātha’s History of Buddhism in India, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi rep.

Tucci, Giuseppe. 1971. “The Validity of Tibetan Historical Tradition”, in Giuseppe Tucci, Opera Minora II, Dott. Giovanni Bardi Editore, Roma. 453-466.

In the 5^th chapter of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (MRP) we find the following stanza, attributed to Diṅnāga (sDe-dge 272b4-5):

slob dpon phyogs kyi glaṅ pos kyaṅ |

’di na mya ṅan ’das lam groṅ khyer du | | de bźin gśegs pa’i gsuṅ gi ñi ma’i ’od can gyis | |

bdag med śes pa’i ’phags pa stoṅ phrag ’jug | blo gros rtsiṅ ba dag gi yul ma yin | |

źes gsuṅs so | |

Into English, it could be rendered thus:

«Furthermore, by the ācārya Diṅnāga it has been said: “There, [only] the one thousand noble ones that knows selflessness by means of the radiant sun of Tathāgata’s words, enter into the citadel [at the end of] the path [leading] to nirvāṇa, [this opportunity] is not withing the domain of [those who has] coarse intellect”».

This citation comes immediately after another one from Kambala, whose contents are very similar (sDe-dge 272b4-5):

dpal kam pa las kyaṅ |

’di ni raṅ rig phra ba ste | | phra ba rnams kyi spyod yul yin | |

bdag cag lta bur gyur pa yi | | blo gros rtsiṅ bas mi śes so | |

źes gsuṅs so | |

That is:

«Moreover, by śrī Kambala it has been said: “This [reality is known by] subtle self-awareness and [therefore] is the domain/object of those who have subtle [intellect]; [it] is not known by the coarse intellect of that class [of low minded persons] like me”».

We owe to Christian Lindtner (1982: 175, note 39) the identification of this stanza with Ālokamāla 13:

svasaṃvedyā tu sā saukṣmyād buddhānām sūkṣmadarśinām |

mādṛśaiḥ svāśrayasthāpi sthūladhībhir na dṛśyate ||

As it can be observed, however, there are several discrepancies between the version quoted in the MRP and the one preserved in its original Sanskrit. These discrepancies are confirmed also by the Tibetan translation of the Ālokamāla:

raṅ rig de yaṅ phra ba’i phyis | | saṅs rgyas rnams kyis phra ba gzigs | |

raṅ la gnas kyaṅ bdag ’dra bas | | rtsiṅ ba’i phyir ni mthoṅ ba med | |

Lindtner translates:

«It [i.e., reality] can, however, due to its subtlety be personally experienced by the subtle-seeing Buddhas. Though (thusness) rests in one’s own body it canot be seen by blockheads like me».

Now, the remarkable lexical differences existing between the two versions open the door to a plenty of possible questions: did the author of the MRP misattribute to Kambala this stanza, which originally came out of the pen of another scholar? Or, do we have a version of Ālokamālā 13 that does not correspond to the one read/studied by our author? Or, did this stanza belong to a lost work of Kambala? And so forth.

Of course these doubts remain unsolvable, at least for the moment. Anyway, what is certain is the fact that the mention of the author’s name and the fact that Ālokamālā 13 is preserved – despite the different readings in MRP – allows us to figure out or, at least, to suppose which was the possible written source the compiler of the MRP had in mind.

On the contrary, after having checked his works listed in the Tibetan Canon and those preserved in Sanskrit, I have been unable to trace Diṅnāga’s stanza back to any of them. But of course I could have failed the task and may be the stanza went totally unnoticed to me for whatever reason. Moreover, I have to confess that I didn’t check the Chinese sources because to me Chinese is… Chinese! To that, I’ve also to add the fact that I’m not so well-versed in Diṅnāga’s texts, which I don’t know as well as I know Nāgārjuna’s or Bhāviveka’s ones. So it is also possible that I have not found the passage because I didn’t know where to look for it.

Thus, let us interact a bit, if you will, by making use of the same questions raised in the case of Kambala.

- Does anybody know if the one quoted above is really a stanza from Diṅnāga and, if yes, from which work it’s taken?

- Or, is it a stanza that could sound as one of Diṅnāga’s, but actually belonging to a text authored by someone else?

- Or, are we in front of a quotation whose original texts it belonged to we have to consider lost (and so, to accept or discard its diṅnāgan authorship, we can only trust, or not, the author of the MRP)?

Refernces

Lindtner, Christian. 1982. “Adversaria Buddhica”, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 26: 167-194.

Lindtner, Christian. 1985. “A Treatise on Buddhist Idealism: Kambala’s Ālokamālā”, in Christian Lindtner (ed. by), Miscellanea Buddhica, Akademisk Forlag, Copenhagen. 109-221.

In the 7th chapter of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, a work traditionally attributed to Bhāviveka, while discussing some fundamental concepts of the cittamātra doctrine, the author inserts an interesting quotation which is attributed to (the tantric?) Candrakīrtipāda (zLa-ba-grags-pa’i-źal-sṅa-na). Unfortunately, the original text from which the citation was taken remains still untraced. Nevertheless, what is interesting here, is the fact that in this excerpt it seems that at least five sub-quotations from other texts are referred to. Of these, for the moment I have been able to indentify the possible source for only the stanza beginning with the pāda: autpala rtsa ba mū la las (number [4], see below), which is indeed very similar – but not identical – to Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā 5.48 (see Eckel 2008: 414), whose Tibetan version runs as follows: autpala rtsa ba mū la las | | lo ma la sogs rgyun ’byuṅ ltar | | de bźin sems rdzas med pa las | | rgyun rnams sna tshogs ’byuṅ bar ’gyur | |; Sanskrit: yathā parṇādisantānaḥ śālūkabahuśaktitaḥ | tathādravyasataś cittāc citrāḥ saṃtativṛttayaḥ ||. Also the explanation of this stanza seems to barely coincide in both the excerpt from Candrakīrtipāda’s text and Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvālā (on account of which see Eckel 2008: 258, 414).

The following is the Tibetan text and English translation of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa passage under concern. In square brackets I have inserted the progressive numbers of the citations contained in Candrakīrtipāda’s text. The sub-citations have been underlined for the sake of better clarity.

(sDe-dge bsTan-’gyur, dBu-ma, vol. 97: TSHa, fol. 280b2-7) slob dpon zla ba grags pa’i źal sṅa nas kyaṅ | ji skad du | [1] de bas na phyi rol gyi dṅos po lta bu dmigs su med ciṅ yod pa ma yin te | sems kyi raṅ bźin yin pa’i phyir ro źes pa daṅ | yaṅ [2] chos thams cad sems las phyi rol na mi gnas te | mig yor tsam du snaṅ ba gaṅ yin pa de thams cad ni raṅ gi sems te | raṅ gi sems ñid las gźan ni ci yaṅ med do źes pa daṅ | yaṅ gsuṅs pa | [3] sems las dṅos po tha dad pa yod do źe na | chos med ces bya’o źes rgyas par gsuṅs so | | ’dir tshigs su bcad pa ni | [4] autpala rtsa ba mū la las | | lo ma la sogs rgyun ’byuṅ ltar | | de bźin sems rdzas med pa yaṅ | | chos rnams kun gyi ṅo bor gnas | | de yi don ni ’di yin te | | autpala’i tsa ba gźan daṅ ma ’brel źiṅ chu ñid la gnas śiṅ rtsa ba der gar yaṅ zug pa med kyaṅ | mtsho śin tu rgya che ba dag lo ma daṅ me tog la sogs pas khyab par nus pa bźin du sems rdzas su med pa ñid yin yaṅ kun rdzob tu phyi naṅ gi chos thams cad kyi ṅo bor gnas so | | yaṅ smras pa | [5] ji ltar lu ma’i sā lu ka | | rtsa ba med kyaṅ thams cad khyab | | rtsa ba med pa’i sems ñid kyaṅ | | nam mkha’i mthas gtugs khyab par gnas | | ’di’i don ni ’di yin te | | mtshe’u daṅ | lu ma dag ba sā lu ka źes bya ba’i sṅo źig phan tshun ’brel pas | me tog ser po źig gis lu ma’i kha chod par skye la de la rtsa ba ni zug pa med do | | de bźin du sems rtsa ba med pa bźin du nam mkhas ji tsam khyab ba de tsam du chos thams cad kyi ṅo bor gnas so | |

Translation:

Moreover, ācārya Candrakīrtipāda [wrote]: «As has been said: [1] “Therefore, the external events are similarly unperceivable and inexistent because there is [only] the nature of mind”; and again [2] “All the dharmas do not dwell outside the mind, what does merely appear [without existing in itself] is [nothing but] a mirage, [thus,] all those [dharmas] are one’s own very mind, [and what is] other than one’s own very mind is something inexistent”; and it is explained also: [3] “If one says ‘the various dharmas exist out of the mind’, [accordingly] it is declared ‘the dharmas are inexistent [in themselves]’”, thus it is explained at length. Here there is a stanza: [4] “Just as the stream of leaves and so on derives from the princial root of a lotus, similarly the nature of all the dharmas, although unreal, dwells in the mind”. The meaning of that [stanza] is this: the root of the lotus is not connected with anything else, it dwells only in the water and, although the root does not thrust everywhere into that [place where it grows], it has the power to cover with leaves and flowers the great surface of a large lake; similarly, the nature of all the external and internal dharmas, [which are] related to saṃvṛti, albeit its absence of reality, dwells in the mind. It is also said: [5] “As the śāluka [lotus sprout] of a pool, although having no root, covers all [the surface of that pool, similarly] the very mind, that has no root, dwells by covering [all] up to the limit of the space”. The meaning of this [stanza] is this: in lakelets and pools, some sprouts called śāluka, being mutually connected, bud by covering the [entire surface of the] pool with yellow flowers, and [nonetheless] the[ir] root does not thrust into that [place]; similarly, as the mind without root covers as much space [as there is], in so much [place] the nature of all the dharmas does dwell».

References

Eckel, Malcolm D. 2008. Bhāviveka and His Buddhist Opponents, Harvard University Press, Cambridge-London.

Today I have received an email from my friend Lara Maconi concerning a fund-finding campain for a documentary on E. Gene Smith (here some among the principal obituaries from newspapers: The Economist, The NY Times, The Telegraph, The Washington Post). Althought the documentary is almost completed, few but essential things are still to be done. The following is the text of the message, that with pleasure I share here with you:

Digital Dharma December 2, 2011

Dear Friends, Our documentary, Digital Dharma, is approaching the finish line.  We’ve just launched our Kickstarter campaign to raise the completion funds for the film. Digital Dharma is the story of E. Gene Smith, the man who saved Tibetan Buddhism. This feature-length documentary uncovers Gene’s 50-year journey with renowned scholars, lamas and laypeople as they struggle to find, preserve and digitize more than 20,000 volumes of ancient Tibetan text. Crossing multiple borders – geographic, political and philosophical - Digital Dharma is an epic story of a cultural rescue and how one man’s mission became the catalyst for an international movement to provide free access to the story of a people.

Status of the Film We have a compelling 86-minute fine cut in the can, but need help with the finishing (music score, audio mix, color correction and mastering) and marketing costs so that we can share Digital Dharma with the widest audience possible and help complete Gene’s mission. Kickstarter Campaign If you’re unfamiliar, here’s how it works: Kickstarter is an online fundraising platform to facilitate public support for ambitious creative projects. We have just 60 days to raise our target $30,000 and are offering great incentives in return for your support.   This is an ALL-OR-NOTHING proposition.  Every Kickstarter project must raise its target funding before its time expires. If we don’t raise our goal of $30,000 in 60 days, we lose everything, and your donation is returned to you. Your contribution is so important. It’s a way for you to help us get the film to the finish line while receiving some great gifts and experiences for your support. If you are able to make a contribution or wish to learn more about our project and Kickstarter, please click the button below: In order to participate, you’ll need to register with Amazon (if you’re not already registered).If you are unable to make a monetary donation, please donate a bit of time and become an outreach partner by telling others about this project. The power of your network can help Digital Dharma reach its goal. What Kinds of Gifts Are We Offering?  We have many different Digital Dharma-themed gifts available for those who support our project, and a donation level for every budget. Some examples: one of fifty “om” charm bracelets made by Gene’s sister Rosanne, or one of five Raku pottery pieces that she handcrafts in her home. Another reward is one of fifteen special first-edition coffee table books that include breathtaking shots from Gene’s journey, taken by the director.     **Please note that these are sample rewards, and not the exact version you will be receiving

We appreciate all your support and look forward to announcing that Digital Dharma has been successfully funded! With gratitude, Dafna Yachin and the Digital Dharma crew

The particular contents of this blog, and the fact that I add more or less only one post per month, are two relevant factors that contribute, on the one side, to select the visitors on the basis of their interests and, on the other side, to keep the number of visitors low. Indeed, and of course, a blog like the present one cannot and could not aim at having as many visitors as other more generic and/or updated blogs do have. However, I have always found very attractive to check on my google.analytics page from which countries visitors come across these pages. The reason is that I assume this information as a sort of sociological study that sheds light on, and puts in evidence, the macroareas where people interested in my research do live.

In order to share this information also with all my dear readers, today I have added a new widget, the FlagCounter (see the first right column on the bottom) by means of which one can monitorize:

- which countries (the flags),

- how many visitors from each country (the number after the flag),

- the total amount of accessed pages (first line on the bottom of the window),

- the total number of countries (second line on the bottom).

So, dear visitor, amaze me! Which country are you from?

As is well-known, according to Indian Cārvāka/Lokāyata materialism (on account of which see here) cognition (jñāna, but also caitanya) emerges only where and when the material elements (earth, water, fire and air) are mixed up to constitute a physical living body. This perspective has been, of course, criticized by lots of non-Cārvaka philosophers in lots of works. In what follows I refer and translate a passage from Vātsyāyana’s commentary on the Nyāyasūtras, where we find a sketch of the materialistic argumentation in favour of the physicity of cognition and its Naiyāyika rebuttal.

Following Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra 3.2.35-36, the first of these two aphorisms would expound a theory, attributed to a general partisan of materialism (called bhūtacaitanika, that is, an upholder of the doctrine that cognition is from material elements), according to whom activity (ārambha) and inactivity (nivṛtti) – that in Nyāyasūtra 3.2.34 are said to be occasioned by desire and aversion (which are, in their turn, defined as marks/properties of ātman) – would belong to the physical body. The second aphorism, on the contrary, represents the Naiyāyikas’ answer:

atra bhūtacaitanika āha | [Nyāyasūtra 3.2.35:] talliṅgatvād icchādveṣayoḥ pārthivādyeṣv apratiṣedhaḥ || ārambhanivṛttiliṅgāv icchādveṣāv iti yasyārambhanivṛttī tasyecchādveṣau tasya jñānam iti prāptaṃ pārthivāpy ataijasavāyavīyānāṃ śarīrāṇām ārambhanivṛttidarśanād icchādveṣajñānair yoga iti caitanyam |

[Nyāyasūtra 3.2.36:] paraśvādiṣv ārambhanivṛttidarśanāt || śarīre caitanyanivṛttiḥ | ārambhanivṛttidarśanād icchādveṣajñānair yoga iti prāptaṃ paraśvādeḥ karaṇasyārambhanivṛttidarśanāc caitanyam iti | atha śarīrasyecchādibhir yogaḥ paraśvādes tu karaṇasyārambhanivṛttī vyabhicarataḥ na tarhy ayaṃ hetuḥ pārthivāpy ataijasavāyavīyānāṃ śarīrāṇām ārambhanivṛttidarśanād icchādveṣajñānair yoga iti |

ayaṃ tarhy anyo’rthaḥ talliṅgatvād icchādveṣayoḥ pārthivādyeṣv apratiṣedhaḥ | pṛthivyādīnāṃ bhūtānām ārambhas tāvat trasasthāvaraśarīreṣu tadavayavavyūhaliṅgaḥ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ loṣṭādiṣu ca liṅgābhāvāt pravṛttiviśeṣābhāvo nivṛttiḥ | ārambhanivṛttiliṅgāv icchādveṣāv iti pārthivādyeṣv aṇuṣu taddarśanād icchādveṣayogas tadyogāj jñānayoga iti siddhaṃ bhūtacaitanyam iti |

kumbhādiṣv anupalabdher ahetuḥ | kumbhādimṛdavayavānāṃ vyūhaliṅgaḥ pravṛttiviśeṣa ārambhaḥ sikatādiṣu pravṛttiviśeṣābhāvo nivṛttiḥ | na ca mṛtsikatānām ārambhanivṛttidarśanād icchādveṣaprayatnajñānair yogaḥ | tasmāt talliṅgatvād icchādveṣayor ity ahetur iti ||

«There, the adherent to the doctrine that cognition is from material elements says: [Nyāyasūtra 3.2.35] “Because they are marks of those [activity and inactivity, which takes place only in presence of a body], there [can] not [be] negation of desire and aversion in these [bodies] made by earth etc.” Desire and aversion are the marks of activity and inactivity; [therefore,] activity and inactivity [are characteristics] of some thing, of which [also] desire and aversion [are characteristics, and] it is proper [to think] that [also] knowledge [must be a characteristic] of that [very thing]; moreover, the [body] made by earth – because activity and inactivity are observed [to be the marks] of bodies not [composed by] igneous and aereal [elements] – does possess desire, aversion and knowledge, and hence cognition.

[Nyāyasūtra 3.2.36] “[We Naiyāyikas reject all this,] because activity and absence of activity are observed in [inanimated things like] axes etc.” [This functions as a] rebuttal of [the idea that] cognition is in the body. [If] it were proper [to admit] that the combination of desire, aversion and knowledge [belongs to the body] because activity and inactividy are observed [in it, then] cognition [should be a property also] of instruments like an axe etc., because activity and inactivity are observed [also there]. But, [if only] the body possesses desire etc., then activity and inactivity of instruments such as an axe etc. deviate from [your argument], and in that case this [of yours] is not a [valid] reason [for upholding that]: moreover, the [body] made by earth – because activity and inactivity are observed [to be the marks] of bodies not [composed by] igneous and aereal [elements] – does possess desire, aversion and knowledge.

[Objection by the materialist:] in that case, this [sūtra], “Because they are marks of those [activity and inactivity], there [can] not [be] negation of desire and aversion in these [bodies] made by earth etc.” has [to be interpreted according to] another meaning. Activity is [a property] of elements like earth etc., insofar as there is a particular spontaneous attitude in moving or immovable [living] bodies, which is a mark of the component limbs of those [very bodies], and inactivity is the absence of that particular spontaneous attitude in [for instance] a lump of clay etc., because of the absence of that mark. Desire and aversion are the marks of activity and inactivity; as those [activity and inactivity] are observed in the atoms of those [elements like] the earthy one etc., there is conjunction with desire and aversion. Because there is conjunction with those [two], there is [also] conjunction with knowledge. Thus it is established that cognition [belongs] to elements.

[Answer: your argument] is not a [valid] reason because of the non perception [of activity and inactivity] in [objects like] a jar etc. [Indeed, if we follow your reasoning,] activity [should be also] a particular spontaneous attitude that is the mark of the [whole] structure of the portions of clay of a jar etc., and inactivity [should be] the absence of that particular spontaneous attitude in [things such as] gravel etc. [where there is no structure of parts]; but [in these inanimate things] there is not conjunction with desire, aversion, effort and knowledge [simply] because activity and inactivity of jars and gravel are observed. Therefore, “Of desire and aversion, because they are marks of those” is not a [valid] reason».

The materialistic perspective can be summarized as follows: (a) activity (ārambha) is a mark of only the living beings (both movable, as animals, and immovable, as vegetals); (b) activity is due to a particular spontaneous attitude (pravṛttiviśeṣa) that is peculiar to those living beings; (c) this particular spontaneous attitude can be peculiar to living beings because in primis it is a mark of the material elements that constitute their parts, and manifests itself only when and where the elements attain the form and nature of a living being. Moreover, (d) cognition is by the materialist proved to belong to the material elements on the basis of its link with desire and aversion (as the sentence tadyogāj jñānayoga, «because there is conjunction with them, there is conjunction with cognition», reveals), which are seen in their turn as the marks of activity and inactivity.

The materialist perspective is criticized by Vātsyāyana as follows. If the materialist upholds that desire and aversion exist where activity and inactivity exist, we have to consider that activity and inactivity can be observed also in non living beings, as for instance in an axe (whose activity depends on someone’s utilization of it). Vātsyāyana’s point is to reject the idea according to which activity and inactivity are primarily defined as marks of physical bodies, which are in their turn thought as an assemblage of different component parts, each of them subjected to activity and inactivity. According to Vātsyāyana, indeed, also inanimate objects have parts – like for example a jar, which has a lip, handels etc. –, but nobody would admit that these parts do actually experience desire, aversion etc.

Two main critical points against materialism follow from these considerations. (A) Cognition cannot be a simple or mere property of the elements, otherwise it should be present in each element, with the consequence that every single body would have a number of cognitions according to as many elements concure to constitute it (this is supported by Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra 3.2.37. (B) Cognition can be neither a property of the parts that constitute a body as such, otherwise it would/should exist in almost every body, because the majority of the existents are formed by different parts linked together (like in the case of a man, a jar etc.).

References

Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, T., Tarkatirtha, A. (1936-1944). Nyāyadarśanam: with Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara’s Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra’s Tātparyaṭīkā and Viśvanātha’s Vṛtti. Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing & Publ.

Colette Caillat, Selected Papers, The Pali Text Society, Bristol 2011, pp. lxxiii + 387.

From the Introduction: «Colette Caillat (1921-2007) was first trained in classical languages (Latin and Greek) and philology at the Sorbonne University, Paris, and started her career by teaching in various secondary schools. Later on, when she turned to the field of Indology, to which she had been attached through comparative linguistics and Sanskrit, she was appointed to a post at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique where she could devote herself entirely to her research. Having obtained her D.Litt. in Indian studies in 1965, she taught as a University Assistant in Lyon, before being elected at the Sorbonne as the successor to Louis Renou whose untimely death was lamented in 1966. Har academic career was then straightforward: she taught at the Sorbonne and Sorbonne-Nouvelle until her retirement in 1988, when she was elected a member of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres the same year.

Middle Inod-Aryan, Jain, and Buddhist studies are the main directions of C. Caillat’s publications».

Contents

Introduction, p. viii.

Bibliography of Colette Caillat’s works: I. Books, p. xxii; II. Editorial work, p. xxiv; III. Articles, p. xxv; IV. Contribution to A Critical Pāli Dictionary and reviews of CPD, p. xxxv; V. Personalia, p. xxxvii; VI. Reviews, p. xxxviii; VII. Index of authors or titles of the works reviewed, p. lxii; VIII. About Colette Caillat, p. lxvi.

Abbreviations, p. lxviii.

Selected Papers

1. Pour une nouvelle grammaire du pāli [Istituto di Indologia della Università di Torino, 1970], p. 1.

2. Deux études de moyen-indien [JA 248 (1960)], p. 25.

3. Nouvelles remarques sur les adjectifs moyen-indien phāsu, phāsuya [JA 249 (1961)], p. 49.

4. Les dérivés moyen-indien du type kārima [JA 253 (1965)], p. 55

5. La sémantique SHYTY dans les inscriptions indo-araméennes d’Aśoka [JA 255 (1966)], p. 75.

6. La finale -ima dans les adjectifs moyen- et néo-indiens de sens spatial [Mélanges d’indianisme à la mémoire de Loius Renou], p. 79.

7. Isipatana migadāya [JA 256 (1968)], p. 97.

8. Pali ibbha, Vedic ibhya [Buddhist Studies in Honour of I.B. Horner], p. 105.

9. À propos de sanskrit candrimā- “clair de lune” [Mélanges linguistiques offerts à Émile Benveniste], p. 115.

10. Forms of the Future in the Gāndhārī Dharmapada [Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (1977-78)], p. 125.

11. Pronoms et adjectifs de similarité en moyen indo-aryen [Indianisme et Bouddhisme], p. 131.

12. La langue primitive du bouddhisme [The Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition], p. 139.

13. États des recherches sur les inscriptions d’Aśoka [BEI 1 (1983)], p. 157.

14. Prohibited speech and subhāsita in the Buddhist Theravāda Tradition [Indologica Taurinensia XII (1984)], p. 165.

15. The Condemnation of False ~ Wrong Speech (musāvāda) in the Pāli Scriptures [Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North-Africa], p. 179.

16. Grammatical Incorrections, Stylistic Choices, Linguistic Trends (with Reference to Middle Indo-Aryan) [Sanskrit and World Culture], p. 183.

17. Sur l’authenticité linguistique des édits d’Aśoka [Dialects et formes dialectales dans les littératures indo-aryennes], p. 191.

18. The constructions mama kṛtam and mayā kṛtam in Asoka’s edicts [Proceedings of the 32. ICANAS, Hamburg 1986], p. 211.

19. Some idiosyncrasies of language and style in Asoka’s Rock Edicts at Girnar [Hinduismus und Buddhismus], p. 213.

20. Notes grammaticales sur les documents kharoṣṭhī de Niya [Documents et archives provenant de l’Asie Centrale, Actes du Colloque franco-japonais, Kyoto 4-8 octobre 1988], p. 227.

21. Asoka et les gens de la brousse (XIII M-N) “qu’ils se repentent et cessent de tuer” [BEI 9 (1991)], p. 243.

22. The “double optative suffix” in Prakrit Asoka XIII (N) na haṃnesu / na haṃñeyasu [Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (1993)], p. 249.

23. Connections between Asokan (Shahbazgarhi) and Niya Prakrit? [IIJ 35 (1992)], p. 259.

24. Deux notes de moyen indo-aryen. I. Les quatre thèmes de présent de HAN- en pāli. II. ‘Double optatif’ en māhārāṣṭhrī jaina ? [BEI 10 (1992)], p. 271.

25. Doublets désinentiels en moyen indo-aryen [Bopp-Symposium 1992 der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin], p. 287.

26. Gleanings from a Comparative Reading of Early Canonical Buddhist and Jaina Text [Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 26,1 (2003)], p. 301.

27. Manuscrits bouddhisques du Gandhāra [CRAI, janvier-mars 2003], p. 327.

Review articles of A Critical Dictionary of Pāli

28. CPD II.1-3 [Indogermanische Forschungen 71.3 (1966), pp. 306-309], p. 335.

29. CPD II.4 [Indogermanische Forschungen 74 (1969), pp. 223-25], p. 339.

30. CPD II.5 [Indogermanische Forschungen 75 (1970), pp. 299-303], p. 343.

31. CPD II.7 [Indogermanische Forschungen 78 (1973), pp. 247-49], p. 349.

32. CPD II.6, CPD II,8 [Indogermanische Forschungen 79 (1974), pp. 250-55], p. 353.

33. CPD II.9 [Indogermanische Forschungen 81 (1976), pp. 327-29], p. 359.

34. CPD II.10, CPD II.11 [Indogermanische Forschungen 88 (1983), pp. 312-18], p. 363.

Word Index, p. 371.

Subject Index, p. 378.

Main authors and texts cited, p. 384.

Corrigenda, p. 387.

The Centre for Eurasiatic and Afroasiatic Studies (CEAS), Bucharest organizes:

The Fifth International Vedic Workshop

Hotel Novotel, sala Paris Rive Droite, Bucharest

20.09.2011 – 11 papers

9.00-11.00 official opening:
Sarvaśākhāsamanvayam vaidikamaṅgalam   
addresses by the organizers: Michael Witzel, Shrikant S. Bahulkar, Jan E. M. Houben

11.00-11.30 coffee break

11.30-13.00 – plenary session: 3 papers
MODERATOR: Asko Parpola
◦ Jan E. M. Houben: From Fuzzy-Edged “Family-Veda” to the Canonical Śākhas of the Catur-Veda: Structures and Tangible Traces
◦ Dipak Bhattacharya: Trayī, triads and the Vedas
◦ Madhav Deshpande: Vedicizing a Post-Vedic Text: The case of Ganeṣa Atharvaśīrṣa Upaniṣad

13.00-15.00 lunch

15.00-17.00 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Yasuke Ikari
◦ Michael Witzel: The Veda Śākhās of Kashmir
◦ Johannes Bronkhorst: Vedic schools in northwestern India
◦ Saraju Rath: Donees and their śākhās in Epigraphical sources: North and Central India
◦ Shrikant S. Bahulkar: Attempts towards Preservation and Revival of the Śaunakīya Atharvaveda

17.00-17.30 break

17.30- 18.30 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Werner Knobl
◦ Hartmut Scharfe: Two on a Swing:  A new Perspective on the Ṛgveda
◦ Cezary Galewicz: The Power of the Printed Veda: on early Indian printed editions of the Ṛgveda
◦ Thennilapuram Mahadevan: Was there a Bāṣkala Ṛgveda?
◦ Braj Bihari Chaubey: Āśvalāyana Saṁhitā: its salient features.

21.09.2011 – 16 papers

 8.30-10.30 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Hartmut Scharfe
◦ Silvia d’Intino:  Les Ecoles védiques et la pratique de l’exégèse. Le cas de Skandasvāmin/The Vedic śākhās and the exegetic work: the case Skandasvāmin
◦ Jared S. Klein: Intrastanzaic Repetition in the Rigveda (Verba and Res): a Final Integration
◦ Eijiro Doyama: Kṣetrasya Pati and Mandhātar
◦ Joel Brereton: Atirātra

10.30-11.00 break

11.00-13.00 – plenary session : 4 papers
MODERATOR: Madhav Deshpande
◦ Yasuke Ikari: The place of the Vādhūla school in the Yajurvedic traditions.
◦ Toshifumi Gotō: A survey of new evidence as to formation of the Yajurveda and Brāhmaṇa texts
◦ Kyoko Amano: The indication of divergent ritual opinions in the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā
◦ Michel Angot: Les deux systèmes d’accentuation dans les parties finales de la branche Taittirīya du Veda (Āraṇyaka et Upaniṣad)

13.00-15.00 lunch

15.00-17.00 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Konrad Klaus 
◦ Asko Parpola: The ritual authorities and Vedic schools and texts quoted or referred to in the Jaiminīya-Śrautasūtra
◦ Masato Fujii: The Sāmavedic Śākhā Backgrounds of the Jaiminīya-Upaniṣad-Brāhmaṇa and the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad: A Comparison
◦ Finnian Moore Gerety: Survivals & Revivals: Notes on the Transmission of Jaiminīya Sāmaveda in Contemporary South India
◦ Anne-Marie Quillet:  La discussion sur le prāyaścitta décryptée : Sāmavidhāna-brāhmaṇa, Prap. I khaṇḍa 5-8/Decrypting the prāyaścitta discussion: Sāmavidhāna-brāhmaṇa, Prap. I khaṇḍa 5-8

17.00-17.30 break

17.30- 18.30 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Dipak Bhattacharya
◦ Elizabeth Tucker: Some Linguistic Features of the Paippalāda Saṃhitā in Relation to the Language of the Ṛgveda
◦ Shilpa Sumant: Karmasamuccaya: A Paippalādin Ritual Manual
◦ Velizar Sadovski: Structure and contents of mantra lists and catalogues in the two major śākhas of the Atharvaveda and in other Vedic traditions.
◦ Julieta Rotaru: Paiṭhīnasi, the dharmakāra of the Atharvavedins and his śākhā

22.09.2011 – 8 papers

8.30-10.30 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Masato Fujii 
◦ Konrad Klaus: The relation between Vedic Śākhās in the light of the Śrautasūtras
◦ Makoto Fushimi: Formation of a Śrautasūtra, — the influence of preceding texts on the BaudhSS
◦ Timothy Lubin: The Baudhāyanīya Contribution to Smārta Hinduism
◦ Naoko Nishimura: The Development of the New- and Full-Moon Sacrifice and the Yajurveda Schools: mantras, their brāhmaṇas, and the offerings

10.30-11.00 break

11.00-13.00 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Patrick Olivelle 
◦ Ambarish Khare: Domestic Rituals in the Taittirīya Tradition: A Study of four Gṛhyasūtras
◦ Anne Keßler-Persaud: Competing composition – The ‘grammar’ of Baudhāyana’s, Āpastamba’s and Hiraṇyakeśin’s marriage ritual
◦ Shingo Einoo: Development of the tradition of the funeral rite in the Āśvalāyana school:  Āśvalāyana Śrautasūtra, gṛhyasūtra and two pariśiṣṭas to the gṛhyasūtra
◦ François Voegeli: Vedic Hunting

13.00-15.00 lunch

Transfer to Sinaia

23.09.2011 – 16 papers

8.30-10.30 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: B.B. Chaubey
◦ S. A. S. Sarma: The Priests of the Avudayar Temple in Tamil Nadu: Promoters of the Agniveśyagṛhyasūtra
◦ G.U. Thite: Āpastamba and other Schools of Vedic Ritual
◦ Junko Sakamoto-Goto: The ultimate Agnihotra (ŚB-M XI 3,1, ŚB-K III 1,4, JB I 19f., VādhAnv II 13)
◦ Nirmala Kulkarni: Scribes of Śukla Yajurvedic Manuscripts

10.30-11.00 break

11.00-13.00 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Joel Brereton
◦ Georges-Jean Pinault: About the name of Bṛhaspati
◦ Eystein Dahl: Morphosyntax and modality in Vedic: The development of the Subjunctive
◦ Junuchi Ozono: The periphrastic perfect in the Vedic language and Pāṇini’s Grammar
◦ Máté Ittzés: Light verb construction vs. simple verb in Vedic

13.00-15.00 lunch

15.00-17.00 – plenary session: 4 papers
MODERATOR: Georges-Jean Pinault
◦ Werner Knobl: The Profane in Vedic Prose. Ways of referring to the extra-ritual and non-mythological reality from inside sacred texts
◦ Alexis Pinchard: Roots and Branches: Veda as an Inverted Tree
◦ Kiyotaka Yoshimizu: Tolerance and Intolerance in Kumārila’s Views on the Vedic śākhā
◦ Maitreyee Deshpande: The Transition in the Concept of Time in Vedic Ritual as Seen in the Several Vedic Schools

17.00-17.30 break

17.30- 18.30 – plenary session : 4 papers
MODERATOR: Toshifumi  Gotō
◦ Madhavi Kolhatkar: Peculiarities of some Vedic Śākhās
◦ Joanna Jurewicz: Aspects of continuity of the Vedic tradition
◦ Borayin Larios: The Veda transmission in contemporary Mahārāṣṭra:
preservation and innovation.
◦ Pt. Chaitanya Narayan: Kale Rare Ved Branches – Present Situation in India

TOTAL: 52 papers